Content integrity you can verify
At build time we compute a SHA-256 hash of every page's clean-text (Markdown) version, publish the set at /transparency.json, and sign the whole manifest with an Ed25519 key. Anyone, a person or an AI agent, can recompute a page's hash and check the signature against our published public key.
Enter a path and click verify.
Verify it yourself
The point of this page is that you do not have to believe it. The verifier is dependency-free and short enough to read before you run it:
curl -sO https://seoeliteagency.com/verify-content.mjs
node verify-content.mjs /naples-ai-visibility-study/It checks two separate things: that the manifest is signed by the key we advertise, and that the page you asked about still hashes to the value inside that signed manifest.
What this proves
The signing key lives on our build machine. It is not on the web host, not in the site's repository, and not held by our CDN. So a valid signature tells you something specific and useful: whoever produced this manifest held our signing key. An attacker who took control of the web host or the CDN, but not the build machine, could not publish content that verifies.
That is a narrower claim than the one this page used to make. Previously we published hashes without a signature and said you could confirm the content had not been tampered with. A hash file served from the same origin as the pages it describes can be rewritten by anyone who can rewrite the pages, so it detected accidental drift and modification in transit, and not much else. The signature is what closes that gap, and the old wording claimed more than the old mechanism delivered.
What this does not prove
It is not a witnessed transparency log. No independent party attests that this manifest is the one we published, which means we could sign a different version of history and you would have no way to detect it from here. Closing that requires external witnesses, and we do not have them. We would rather name the gap than let a passing check imply it is filled.
Key distribution is the trust anchor. You fetch our public key from this same site, so an attacker holding both the host and the signing key defeats the whole scheme. If you want the stronger property, record the key fingerprint somewhere we do not control and compare it on a later visit.
Finally, this binds bytes to a key. It says nothing about whether the content is correct. Accuracy is what our sourcing and our published corrections are for; this is only about whether the page you are reading is the page we signed.